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Phishing is the use of social engineering and electronic communications such as emails
to try and illicit sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and financial information. This form of identity theft has become a rampant problem in today’s society.
Phishing attacks have cost financial institutions millions of dollars per year and continue
to do so.
Today’s defense against phishing attacks primarily consists of trying to take down the
phishing web site as quickly as possible before it can claim too many victims. This thesis
demonstrates that is possible to track down a phisher to the IP address of the phisher’s
workstation rather than innocent machines used as intermediaries. By using web bugs and
honeytokens on the fake web site forms the phisher presents, one can log accesses to the
web bugs by the phisher when the attacker views the results of the forms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Phishing, or password harvesting fishing to some [2], is the use of social engineering
and spam e-mails to try to elicit sensitive information, such as usernames, passwords,
and financial information. This form of identity theft is a major problem in information
security today. Phishing attacks cost financial institutions millions of dollars per year. In a
one year period that ended in April of 2004, there were an estimated 1.8 million phishing
attacks that generated $1.2 billion USD in losses. When people are victimized by phishing
attacks, their bank or other financial institution typically reimburses them for damages just
like any other form of identity theft. Even though this institution has done nothing wrong,
they are the ones that ultimately pay the price [3].
Financial institutions are also victimized in another way that is often overlooked. When
people become victims of phishing attacks or become aware of the threat of phishing attacks, the financial institution loses the ability to communicate with their customer base
through email. Their customers no longer trust emails that come from those institutions
and usually assume it to be a phishing email [4]. Customers also tend to blame the legitimate institution for phishing attacks.
It is becoming increasingly important to try to protect against phishing attacks. These
phishing attacks need to be tracked down to their source, so that attackers can be identified
1

and stopped. This thesis aims to introduce a new way of investigating phishing attacks
to the actual IP address of the phisher’s machine, rather than simply the IP address of
one of the computers that the attacker has compromised for use in attacks. The set of
compromised machines that an attacker uses is known as a botnet. The experiment is
explained in section 3.1.

1.1

Introduction to Phishing and Social Engineering
The Anti-Phishing Working Group defines phishing as attacks that “use both social

engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials” [4]. The first known instance occurred in the mid-1990s when
phishing schemes obtained America Online user names and passwords [12].
Phishing typically involves an email posing as a legitimate company, usually a financial institution. Graphical elements, such as company logos identical to the ones on the
institution’s web site, increase the apparent legitimacy of the email. The user is presented
with a message, that purports to be from the legitimate company, that calls the user to
some action. For example, this may be a request for updated information, verification of
identity, or a notification something has changed. By combining the problem with the
account, the phisher preys on the victim’s emotions affecting their ability to process what
is happening. When the user accesses the link, it then takes them to a website that looks
authentic since the attacker again uses the same graphics and layout as the legitimate web
site but is designed to elicit personal information from the user which is sent to the phisher.

2

Attackers have long been trying to obtain secret information from others. Originally
this was done solely through the process of “social engineering”. Kevin Mitnick defines social engineering as “getting people to do things they wouldn’t ordinarily do for
a stranger” [8]. A social engineer tries to deceive a trusted user of a system to reveal secret information or tricks the social engineer would not otherwise know. He describes how
the individual is the weakest link of security. Social engineering attacks prey on users who
are typically ignorant about good security practices. This is the one attack that technology
cannot prevent [8].
To demonstrate how easy this attack can happen, Mitnick tells the story of Stanley
Mark Rifkin and his attack on Security Pacific National Bank. In 1978, Rifkin walked
into the bank’s authorization-personnel-only wire-transfer room. He was working for a
company contracted to develop a backup system for the room’s data. This gave him access
to the transfer procedures. This allowed him to learn that the authorized people received a
daily code every morning. These people did not bother memorizing the code. They instead
posted it inside the room. Rifkin was then able to call the room from a pay phone posing
as Mike Hansen, a member of the bank’s International Department. After giving an office
number and the code he was able to give instructions to wire ten million two hundred
thousand dollars to a bank account he had already set up. The wire room then asked for
the inter-office settlement number. Rifkin did not anticipate that question and therefore
did not have the answer. He simply stated that he would check the number and call right
back. Rifkin then changed hats and called the International Department posing to be the
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wire room and asked for the number. He then called the wire room back and finished the
transaction [8].
Today’s social engineer does not require direct communication with their victim. Thanks
to the widespread use of the internet, social engineering is easier than ever before. A social engineer can victimize anyone from anywhere. Also, in Mitnick’s story, Rifkin had to
keep his nerves and wits about him in order to not give away the scam. With the Internet,
the social engineer does not have direct contact with his victim. The social engineer does
not have to worry about the inflection in his voice or any other physiological clues giving
away the scam. The interpersonal skills used in attacks such as those described by Mitnick
are not necessary to execute phishing attacks on the Internet.
Dr. Max Kilger believes that the motives of computer attackers can be explained with
the acronym MEECES. This stands for Money, Ego, Entertainment, Cause, Entrance to
a social group, and Status [9]. The CEO of Cyota, Naftali Bennett, believes that phishing has become popular because as it stands right now, there is little risk but potentially
great rewards [3]. The risk is low due to the lack of effective methods for tracking down
phishing attacks to their source and the low probability of being prosecuted. Most phishing investigative techniques can only track the attack to the server where the phishing site
was hosted or to a botnet used to relay the emails. The server hosting the site is usually a
compromised server that has no direct connection to the attacker.

4

1.2

Introduction to Web Bugs
A web bug can be defined as any HTML element that is used to, at least in part, secretly

gather information about users who navigate to a site that contains that element. Usually
these come in the form of images. For that reason, they are sometimes referred to as pixel
tags and clear GIFs [6]. These images could be as large as the web site’s logo or as small
as one square pixel.
David Martin, et al. mentions several different things that web bugs can do. A few of
these include:
• Count web site hits
• Send demographic data to a internet marketing company such as gender, age, and
zip code with the help of a cookie
• Track web browsing habits of a user
• Report browser information back to a web site [6]
Web bugs can accomplish some of this by explicitly giving an image a unique file name
for that particular web user. An example of a web bug in use can be seen in emails. This
technique has been used by spammers in the past and by a company sending out legitimate
promotional emails as well. A 1x1 pixel white image can be created with a particular email
address embedded into the filename such as joesmith example com.gif. The spammer
will then embed this image into that email to joesmith@example.com. When Joe Smith
views his email, the small white image will go unnoticed. The image is loaded from
the spammer’s web server, and will create an entry on the server log for the filename
joesmith example com.gif. The spammer now knows that Joe Smith received his email
and will continue to use that email address in future spam attacks. Some web-based email
5

providers and vendors of desktop email software have disabled the retrieval of images in
incoming emails for this reason.

1.3

Introduction to Honeytokens
Lance Spitzner, the leader of the Honeynet Project, has defined the term honeytoken

as “a digital or information system resource whose value lies in the unauthorized use of
that resource” [10]. Honeytokens can be any digital data. They can consist of documents,
images, or even data such as a phony login/password combination. A honeytoken may be
any data on a system for which accesses can be logged, and whose access automatically
implies unauthorized activity.
While the term ‘honeytoken’ is new, the concept is not. The term ‘honeytoken’ was
created by Augusto Paes de Barros on February 21, 2003. He used it in a email that went to
a list of security professionals [11]. Spitzner further mentions that some map makers insert
phony roads or cities on their maps for proof when competitors sell copies of their maps.
Spitzner gives other hypothetical examples of honeytokens in use. One such example
shows how a honeytoken could possibly help in database security. Hospitals could create
a bogus medical record for John F. Kennedy and then track the access to that tuple of the
database. Anyone who views that record is in violation of regulations and rules that are
meant to protect the privacy of patient data. This is because stored procedures and other
layers of database access can be designed to avoid accessing honeytokens. In this situation,
access to a honeytoken implies that the database is not being accessed through approved
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means. Also, financial institutions can create bogus accounts. If one tries to access those
accounts, then the institution’s system has been compromised [10].
The key to using honeytokens is to give the token unique identifiable elements to guarantee that the only access to that token is by unauthorized parties. If the token could be
viewed in normal interaction with a system, the token’s tracking ability is compromised.
Honeytokens’ greatest advantages lie in their flexibility and their minimal cost.

1.4

Hypothesis and Methodology
This research combines the concepts of web bugs and honeytokens and uses them

against phishing attacks. Web bugs are sent to phishers via the web forms used in attacks. Since these web bugs are named specific to each phishing attack and should not
be accessed in normal web browsing, then they also function as honeytokens. These web
bugs should only be accessed by the phisher and no one else. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
The combination of HTML web bugs and honeytokens can be used against
phishers to track the phishing attacks to their source thus being able to help
stop phishing where the problem starts.

This research is not simply testing a phishing investigation technique, it looks at phishing attacks as a whole. This will lead to new discoveries beyond the success of the phishing
investigation technique. Other goals of this research are to answer the following questions:
1. What methods and motives of phishing attacks can be discovered?
2. What other vulnerabilities are available to use against phishing attacks?
3. Can new phishing defenses be uncovered?
7

In addition to investigating phishing attacks, this research aims to develop a profile for
phishing attacks similar to what honeypots have done for general network security. By
walking through their entire attack and investigating where the results are being viewed,
lots of information can be discovered about a phisher. This could help in developing a
profile on typical phishing attacks.
This investigative method does has its shortcomings which will be discussed later. This
is why discovering other vulnerabilities in phishing attacks can lead to a much more effective phishing investigation strategy. This is based on the totality of computer security.
When a person only secures one aspect of their system, then an attacker simply uses another method. If you only attack one of a phishing scheme’s vulnerabilities, then they will
eventually fix the vulnerability, reducing the effectiveness of the attack.
This research presents a new investigative technique, rather than a defense against
phishing attacks. However, by exploring the totality of phishing attacks, profiling the
attackers, and exploring the vulnerabilities of phishing attacks, it is possible that other
methods of phishing investigations and defenses could be developed.

8

CHAPTER 2
CURRENT EFFORTS

2.1

Defenses Against Phishing
There are currently numerous approaches to protecting users from phishing schemes.

As previously mentioned, these approaches do not get to the root of the problem. These
methods do not track down the phishing schemes to the individual or group running the
scam.
The simplest of these methods is to attempt to take down phishing sites quickly. Web
crawlers similar to those used for search engines can also be used to find phishing sites.
The information is then passed on to the appropriate Internet Service Provider (ISP) in
order to take the site down. This method is flawed because of the difficulty in finding these
sites quickly. Also, some websites hosted in foreign countries do not have similar laws
that can justify removing the site.
One defense is to flood a phisher’s database with false information. This flood of information is not intended on being a denial of service (DOS) attack. This flood is designed to
make the phisher unable to distinguish correct data from incorrect data in their database.
This makes the user’s database virtually unusable. This method does nothing to prevent
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phishing attacks. It simply tries to minimize the ability to carry through with the theft of
financial data [3].
Another defense is to provide a two-phase authentication process for users in e-mail
and on the corporate website. An example of this would include the normal username/password
combination combined with a authenticating image and/or phrase chosen by the user. Any
time the corporation sends out an e-mail to a user, they would include this personal phrase
and image in the e-mail. Since a phisher would not know this information, then the e-mail
is validated. By the same token, including the image and phrase on the corporation website as part of the login process would also validate the website to the user as well. This
can help prevent phishing attacks by providing authentication of communication between
a user and a corporation [3].
One of the few current approaches that can possibly target the root of the problem is
to watch corporation’s web logs for users downloading their images. Creators of phishing
websites usually use the actual images from the corporate website to make the phishing
website more believable. If users are downloading images to their personal computer, then
their IP address will show up in the server logs. The Corillian Fraud Detection System
(CFDS) is a commercial server that looks for such a behavior in web logs. It then investigates further to find the phishing site that is illegally using those images. Corillian then
notifies the administrator of the compromised server and the authorities [3].
Internet browser creators are trying to help out as well. This usually involves comparing the address of a web site to a list of ‘blacklisted’ websites. This blacklist can come
from the browser’s creators, users, and other sources. The sites may also have a list of
10

‘whitelist’ websites as well. If a site does not apply to either list then some security measures may be put in place such as disabling mobile code like ActiveX and JavaScript [3].
Internet Explorer 7.2 disallows mobile code to disable the address bar. Phishers often do
this to hide the actual location of the site. They can even include a fake address bar showing a fake URL to further fool the user. This version of Internet Explorer also includes a
phishing filter which allows users to report a phishing site. This reporting eventually can
lead to the site becoming blacklisted and all users of IE are notified at any future visits to
the site. Users are notified of both confirmed and suspicious phishing sites [7].

2.2

Uses of Honeytokens and Web Bugs
Both honeytokens and web bugs are still relatively new ideas. The full potentials of

honeytokens and web bugs have yet to be realized. Especially in the case of honeytokens,
most ideas are still in the hypothetical stage.
One early example of the use of honeytokens occurred in 1986. Clifford Stoll, working as a programmer for Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, placed phony records
for a fictitious organization named Strategic Defense Initiative Network deep into the lab’s
server. After the files were downloaded by intruders, Stoll received a letter about the company. With the help of federal investigators, Stoll traced the intruders to East German and
Soviet intelligence agencies. ForeScout Technologies actually uses honeytokens to help
as an intrusion detection system (IDS). Their software detects ‘surreptitious reconnaissance’, i.e. port scans. Then the software announces a false message of vulnerability to
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the intruder. If the intruder follows up with an attack, then the connection is terminated
[11].
ForeScout Technologies’ use of honeytokens demonstrates another advantage. When
used with an IDS, it can help eliminate false positives. When an IDS is designed to trigger
on honeytokens as opposed to normal rules, then false positives can be minimized, and
more intrusions can be detected.
As previously mentioned web bugs can be used for primitive e-mail tracking. This
technique could be applied to track down the source of the ‘Nigerian Scam’, or ’419 scam’,
emails that try to convince users to supply their bank account information in order to
receive a large charitable donation. These emails want you to reply to the e-mail to swap
personal information. A web bug picture could be simply added to the reply in order to try
and investigate the source.
Web bugs are not just limited to web pages and e-mail. Web bugs can also be hidden
in Microsoft Word documents. Microsoft Word allows a document to link to an image on
a remote server. The document only stores the link to the image and not the image itself;
therefore, every time the document is opened, the image has to be loaded from the remote
server. Harding, et al. lists a few instances where web bugs would be useful in Microsoft
Word documents:
• Discovering and keeping up with any possible leaks of confidential documents
• Keeping up with any possible copyright infringement of newsletters and reports
• Keeping up with the distribution of a press release
• Tracking quoted text that is copied and pasted from one word document to another.

12

Harding adds that web bugs can also be used in Excel 2000 and PowerPoint 2000 files
[5].
The biggest security risk with web bugs is when they are combined with cookies to
obtain information about a user. These two tools combined are a threat to internet privacy
and anonymity. This threat is realized when cookies from two or more sites belonging to
the same ad agency are stored on the same computer. These sites each contain web bugs
that point back to the ad agency. When a user visits one of those sites, the web bug will be
loaded and information will be sent back to the host server. Included in this information
would be a previously set cookie value from the user’s hard drive. When the user then
goes to another site, the ad agency can cross-reference the visits to the same user based on
the cookie’s values that are sent with the web bugs. The ad agency that can begin to gather
information on the user’s browsing habits within their ad network [5].
The use of web bugs by websites is much more prevalent than most people realize.
David Martin, et al. did a study on web bugs. In their study they analyzed two lists
of websites. One list contained 84 web sites that were marked as the most popular in
January 2000. The second list contained a random list of 298 consumer-oriented web
sites. The study used Bugnosis to analyze an average of approximately 90 pages from
each website. This study found 58% of ‘the popular websites contained web bugs and
36% of the consumer-oriented websites [6].

13

CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT

3.1

Initial Experiment
Using web bugs and honeytokens, this research attempts to describe a method for

tracking down phishing attacks to the source. This involves filling out the phishers’ web
forms with HTML image tags of one square pixel images and HTML web page links. Both
the image files and the web page links were hosted on a machine in a laboratory environment with an unrestricted internet connection. This machine was on its own dedicated
subnet separate from the rest of the campus network. In the event that a phisher decides
to attack the research system, this protects the departmental and campus network from
being compromised. The images in this project can be considered web bugs since they
are named uniquely for each phishing e-mail and can be used to gather information about
the individual or group that views the data collected from the phishing scheme. Both the
image files and the HTML files can also be viewed as honeytokens since they are pieces of
data that are unlikely to be accessed by users other than those involved in specific phishing
schemes.
The image and HTML files are both named using a timestamp in order to give them a
unique name. That filename is stored, along with the URL of the attack, to associate the
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files with each particular phishing attack. As previously mentioned, if the phisher views
the results in an HTML enabled environment that does not filter or block third party images
from being loaded, such as many webmail applications, browsers, and applications such
as Outlook, the images will be retrieved from the server unknowingly by the attacker. The
phisher will likely know that something is not right with the data due to the links being
displayed and the lack of personal information. By the time the phisher realizes this, the
image is already loaded. Any further investigation by the phisher will likely result in more
information being logged about them. If the phisher’s client software loads the images
or the phisher accesses the hyperlinks, a referral will be generated in the web logs on the
tracking server. Some of the information included in the log file is:
• The IP address of the actual box where the results were viewed
• The webpage where the phisher viewed the results including webmail accounts like
GMail, Yahoo Mail, or Hotmail
• The browser type that was used to view these results
• A guess at the operating system the phisher is working from

An analysis of an actual experimental referral that was generated is shown in Section
3.3.

3.1.1

Example Case

In order to test this concept at tracking phishing schemes, two simple webpage forms
were created for testing the process. One form to test the ‘get’ form request, and the second
to test the ’post’ form request. Both of these files are shown in Appendix B. Most phishing
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attacks begin with a login page, so the two forms were created as login forms for testing.
The form was then fed HTML tags similar to the following:
• <a href=‘‘http://192.168.0.0/html/
2005_Nov_28_11_20_05.html’’>myspam@hotmail.com</a>
• <img src=‘‘http://192.168.0.0/images/
2005_Nov_28_11_20_05.gif’’>

Lastly, a web page was created that displayed the results of the fictitious phishing site.
This file is shown in Appendix B as well. This web page was opened up in a web browser
that allowed the viewing of third-party images. To guarantee that a referral had been made,
some of the web page links were accessed as well. At this point the web server log files on
the experimental machine were checked, and it was confirmed that the referral was made
from the phishing investigation.

3.1.2

Real World Cases

E-mails were sent to all the faculty and grad students in the CSE department asking
them to submit phishing e-mails they had received for use in the experiment. Other individuals that were capable of identifying phishing schemes were asked to do the same.
Originally the plan was to automate the process with a single Perl script or series
of scripts. The scripts used the Unix utility wget to automate the form submissions. A
problem arose when it was noticed the script was not able to handle redirect pages in the
case of nested forms. Due to the limited time available for this test case, it was decided to
continue doing the form submission manually to achieve results and to prove tracking was
possible.
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The Perl script used to automate this process was modified to simply take the input of
a particular web site URL, generate the appropriate image and HTML files, and store the
web site URL with the image and HTML filenames into a comma-separated values (csv)
file. The HTML values could then be copied and pasted into the individual fields of the
phisher’s forms. If the entire HTML tag could not fit into a form field, then the values
were simply created with fictitious names, or in the case of number fields such as credit
card numbers, the appropriate number of 5’s were input into the field. This problem can
be bypassed once the process is automated. An automation script could bypass the HTML
form restrictions and any possible JavaScript-based error checking. Another alternative
solution is to use a proxy server designed for web application security testing, such as
BurpSuite [1]. This will allow the outgoing data stream to be filtered in order to allow
the HTML tags to be entered into the outgoing data. After submitting form data, the
packet can be changed to include the HTML tags. This would also bypass the HTML
form restrictions and JavaScript-based error checking.
During the week of November 11 through November 18, eleven phishing sites were
investigated and two referrals were found. Some of the other nine attacks may not have
generated referrals since the only fields that would accept the full HTML tag were the
login fields. If the phisher was not worried about the login parameters and only looked at
the financial data from later forms, then the referral would not occur. In some cases, none
of the fields would accept the full HTML tag. This problem could again be fixed by script
automation or by the use of a proxy server. A sanitized version of one of the referrals that
was generated during this week is shown below:
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82.79.137.22 - - [11/Nov/2005:12:08:12 -0600] ‘‘GET
/images/2005_Nov_12_11_52_53.gif/ HTTP/1.1’’ 404 309
‘‘http://mail.google.com/mail/h/15zatsmc8x2ql/
?th=1078083bcd28d7d6&v=c’’ ‘‘Mozilla/4.0
(compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98) Opera 7.50 [en]’’

We can infer the following from this referral:
• The results of the attack were e-mailed to the attacker via a GMail e-mail account.
Attempts to reproduce the GMail session by entering the URL into a browser were
unsuccessful. The user would have had to allow the images to be loaded since GMail
does not load images by default.
• Using the IP address, a whois query can be executed, possibly revealing information about the attacker’s physical location, or another machine or proxy under the
attacker’s control.
• The Opera web browser was used by the attacker to view his information.

Actually tracking the source of the phishing scheme occurs with a whois query of the
IP address given in the referral. Using the IP address from the previous referral returned
the following:
inetnum:
netname:
descr:
country:
admin-c:
tech-c:
tech-c:
status:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
mnt-by:
mnt-lower:
source:

82.79.137.0 - 82.79.137.63
RO-BZ-METRONETWORK
Metronetwork SRL
RO
IS1460-RIPE
IS1460-RIPE
RDS-RIPE
ASSIGNED PA
+----------------------------------------+
| ABUSE CONTACT: abuse@rdsnet.ro IN CASE |
| OF HACK ATTACKS, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY,
|
| VIOLATION, SCAMS, PROBES, SPAM, ETC.
|
+----------------------------------------+
AS8708-MNT
AS8708-MNT
RIPE # Filtered

role:

Romania Data Systems NOC
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address:
address:
phone:
fax-no:
e-mail:
admin-c:
tech-c:
tech-c:
nic-hdl:
mnt-by:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
source:

71-75 Dr. Staicovici
Bucharest / ROMANIA
+40 21 30 10 888
+40 21 30 10 892
contact-tech@rdsnet.ro
CN19-RIPE
CN19-RIPE
GEPU1-RIPE
RDS-RIPE
AS8708-MNT
+----------------------------------------+
| ABUSE CONTACT: abuse@rdsnet.ro IN CASE |
| OF HACK ATTACKS, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY,
|
| VIOLATION, SCAMS, PROBES, SPAM, ETC.
|
+----------------------------------------+
RIPE # Filtered

person:
address:
address:
phone:
fax-no:
e-mail:
nic-hdl:
mnt-by:
mnt-by:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
remarks:
source:

Iordache Silviu
Str Traian Vuia, bl 16,sc. C, et3, ap.54
Buzau / Romania
+4-0744821745
+4-338401143
iorsior@yahoo.com
IS1460-RIPE
AS8708-MNT
AS8708-MNT
+----------------------------------------+
| ABUSE CONTACT: abuse@rdsnet.ro IN CASE |
| OF HACK ATTACKS, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY,
|
| VIOLATION, SCAMS, PROBES, SPAM, ETC.
|
+----------------------------------------+
RIPE # Filtered

% Information related to ’82.76.0.0/14AS8708’
route:
descr:
origin:
mnt-by:
source:

82.76.0.0/14
RDSNET
AS8708
AS8708-MNT
RIPE # Filtered

From this whois query, quite a bit of information can be gathered:
• The entire range of IP addresses that this organization owns is shown.
19

• The actual street address, city, state and zip of this organization that owns that IP
address is given. In this case, the owner of this IP address resides in Bucharest,
Romania.
• Phone numbers for the organization are given.
• A e-mail contact for general communications is provided.
• Another e-mail contact where abuse is reported.
• A named contact who is a Senior IP engineer in this organization is given with his
e-mail and phone number.

At this point, the investigation moves to the ISP that owns the particular IP address.
In order to trace the source of the IP, the ISP would have to check their logs to try and
determine what machine was logged in at the particular IP address at a given time.

3.2

Technique Advantages and Disandvantages
There are limitations of tracking by IP addresses. Many ISPs use dynamic IPs with

their customers. Every time a machine logs on to the ISP’s network, they could have a
different IP address. This makes it very difficult to determine who had a particular IP
address at a particular time. Some ISPs do not actually log IP assignments; therefore, the
machine that was using a particular IP at a particular time cannot be determined. Other
limitations include the use of public wireless access points at coffee shops and other public
venues, the use of anonymous proxies which hide the actual IP address of a particular
machine, and cooperation of foreign ISPs in providing information on the possible phisher.
Another disadvantage with this technique is that the images may not be loaded by the
phisher when he checks his results. If the results are viewed in a non-HTML environment,
then the images will not be loaded, and no log entry will be generated. Also many web
20

based e-mail, which it is believed the phishers’ use, allow the blocking of images in emails. An e-mail user might have to explicitly tell the browser to load the images.

3.3

Experiment Conclusions
In conclusion, this trial experiment did show that this investigative method could be a

valid way of tracking down phishing attacks. With this type of investigation, the attacks
can actually be traced to the source of the problem in some situations.
Since most of the data in this project came from members of the CSE department both
students and faculty, a very limited variety of phishing attack methods were seen. A larger
variety in phishing attack methods would more thoroughly test the investigation method.
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CHAPTER 4
FINAL EXPERIMENT

4.1

Experiment Setup
This experiment was run from June 20, 2007 through October 5, 2007. Fifty-one

sites were investigated using emails forwarded from Mississippi State University Computer Science and Engineering faculty, grad students, BullyLUG (the local Linux Users
Group), others capable of identifying phishing emails and web page links from the web
site http://www.phishtank.com.
Initially phishing sites were gathered solely from e-mail traffic. This was proven to be
an ineffective method due to the lack of new phishing emails received. When the e-mail
was received, the website URL, and the company that was being phished was recorded.
Once the site was loaded, the IP of the site compromised was recorded along with the
country of the ISP hosting the compromised site. The honeytokens were manually entered
into the site if possible. If not, the values were entered after submitting the data via a web
proxy. While browsing the site and filling out the forms, anything unique about the site
was recorded along with the scripting language used with the forms.
Ultimately acquiring phishing sites via email traffic was inefficient and did not produce
enough data. PhishTank.com was given as another source for phishing attacks. The site
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allows users to submit phishing sites. Registered members to the site can confirm or reject
the site as a phishing site. Once enough votes are gathered, the site is either confirmed or
rejected. Users can also submit a site to see if it has already been submitted, confirmed, or
rejected as a phishing site. This site was then used to obtain links to phishing sites for the
remainder of the experiment. Data was still collected in the same manner.
The following three tables show a breakdown in the countries hosting compromised
servers, companies that were phished, and the scripting languages used on these sites.
The phishing sites investigated revealed nineteen different country locations. Out of these
nineteen countries, the top four countries with phishing sites were the United States with
fifteen, Korea with six, and Australia and the Netherlands with five. These sites also
revealed eighteen companies being phished. The top four companies phished were PayPal
with thirteen, Ebay with eleven, and Bank of America and Citizen’s Bank with five. PHP
was an overwhelming majority among the scripting languages used. Forty-two of the fiftyone sites used PHP. Nineteen of those forty-three used JavaScript for their error checking.
The web server logs were checked every few minutes after the investigation for the first
20 - 30 minutes and then ever few hours to determine if a referral had been made. Once
a referral was found, the referral was recorded along with the IP of the phisher, country
of origin of the IP, website viewed (if applicable), OS, browser (if applicable), and turn
around time.
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Table 4.1
Countries with Compromised Web Servers
Country of Compromised Server Count
United States
15
Korea
6
Australia
5
Netherlands
5
Taiwan
3
Germany
2
Russia
2
United Kingdom
2
Bahrain
1
Canada
1
Denmark
1
Ecuador
1
France
1
Japan
1
Mexico
1
Portugal
1
San Salvador
1
Serbia and Montenegro
1
Thailand
1
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Table 4.2
Companies that were Phished
Companies Phished
PayPal
Ebay
Bank of America
Citizen’s Bank
Capital One
NatWest Bank
Wachovia
Amazon
Bank of the Cascades
BankTennesee
Citadel FCU
Citibank
E*TRADE
Halifax
MidAmerica Bank
NetBank
Yahoo Mail

Count
13
11
5
5
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 4.3
Scripting Languages that were used
Scripting Language Used
PHP
PHP & JavaScript
JavaScript
ASP
CGI
ASP & JavaScript
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Count
23
19
4
2
2
1

4.2

Results
Part of the research goals was to create automation scripts to perform the investigation.

Initial scripts were created using the Python programming language. Some basic testing
was done on the scripts with simulated phishing sites initially with great success. Once the
script began to be used on live phishing sites, new reasons for the script to fail were found
with each email. Some of these methods include, but are not limited to:
• Encoded HTML files
• Some types of HTML and other script redirects
• HTML tags spread over multiple lines

Initially, the script was modified to handle changes that were discovered, but each
phishing email brought new bugs. During these testing runs, a referral was never generated
from any site. Eventually it was determined that the automation script was too large of a
project to handle an efficient variety of phishing sites to be useful in this investigation.
It was deemed that the final data was more important than the automation process. The
only way to guarantee the result data was to run the investigation manually. Therefore, the
final investigation was done manually as outlined in the real world preliminary experiment
discussed in Section 3.1.2. The automation script is included in Appendix C as a starting
point for any future work.
The investigation set out to accomplish two different tasks. First and foremost was
to quantify the ability of the investigation technique to obtain a single source IP of the
phisher. The second task was to begin to develop a profile of a typical phisher for use in
developing further investigation or protection techniques.
26

For the the first task, fifty-one sites were investigated with thirteen returning at least
one HTML referral for a 25.5% success rate. The peak success rate over the course of the
investigation was approximately 27 - 28%. The full details of the sites investigated and the
referrals generated are listed in Appendix E. Of the thirteen sites, eight had referrals from
the html links, eleven had referrals from the image links, and six had referrals from both.
Among the seven that did not have referrals from both the images and the HTML links,
five were image referrals.
As can be seen, most of the referrals were generated by the image links which was
expected. The number of referrals from HTML links does lessen the concern of images
being blocked by browsers or email applications. This gives further hope that the referral
percentage can be increased as the method is refined.
In order to begin to profile the typical phisher, several factors were gathered from the
HTML referrals and the sites being investigated. These factors are:
• Factors listed in previous section
• Location of phisher
• Browser used by phisher
• Operating system used by phisher
Phishers were indentified from only 3 countries. United States and the Netherlands
each had 6 phishing attacks traced back to them, with Romania being the third country.
Most of the United States IP belonged to IP addresses owned by AOL. This could be
phishers who used free AOL hours from CDs to carry out their phishing attack. This
could make tracking down the phisher difficult depending on the accuracy in the details
registered with the account.
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Table 4.4
Countries of IPs Used by Phishers
Countries of IPs Used by Phishers
Netherlands
United States
Romania

Count
6
6
1

Firefox and Internet Explorer came back as the only browsers used by phishers. Internet Explorer led with eight referrals, with Firefox having the other five. These results were
fairly expected due to the vast popularity of these two browsers.
Table 4.5
Browsers Used by Phishers
Browsers Used by Phishers
Internet Explorer
Firefox

Count
8
5

Windows was an overwhelming choice of operating system. Twelve of the thirteen
referrals used it as their Operating System, with Linux taking the other referral.
The results of this investigation show a typical phisher was using an ISP in the United
States to hack a U.S. webserver. The phisher will then use that web server to host either
a PayPal or Ebay website scripted with the PHP language and possibly JavaScript error
checking. The phisher will then view these results using a computer with the Windows
operating system and the Internet Explorer web browser.
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Table 4.6
Operating Systems used by Phishers
Browsers Used by Phishers
Windows NT 5.1
Linux
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Count
12
1

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

5.1

Conclusions
This chapter returns to the hypothesis and research questions detailed in section 1.4.

The data outlined in the previous section is used to either confirm or refute the hypothesis.
Also, the data is used to answer the original research questions.
The hypothesis from section 1.4 was given as follows:
The combination of HTML web bugs and honeytokens can be used against
phishers to track the phishing attacks to their source thus being able to help
stop phishing where the problem starts.

In addition the research questions were as follows:
1. What methods and motives of phishing attacks can be discovered?
2. What other vulnerabilities are available to use against phishing attacks?
3. Can new phishing defenses be uncovered?

The hypothesis was proven in this particular experiment by the fact that 1 out of every 4 phishing attacks were successfully traced back to a single IP source address. With
additional work on automated scripts, we believe this percentage could improve.
As addressed in section 4.2, the typical phisher method used here was to use the scripting language PHP to handle client-server interactions and to create the phishing website
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and JavaScript to handle error checking on the phishing site. The phisher would then check
for results using a Windows operating system and the Internet Explorer web browser.
The motives of the phisher varied greatly among the sites investigated. The level of
detail in information that the phisher attempted to acquire varied from basic credit card
information to asking for social security numbers, checking account numbers, routing
numbers, and even the mother’s maiden name. Ten of the fifty-one phishing sites only
attempted to acquire username/password combinations from potential victims as opposed
to asking for more detailed financial information.
Other vulnerabilites and new phishing defenses can possibly be uncovered by looking at the tools used by the majority of phishers. Security vulnerabilities particular to
the Windows operating system and the Internet Explorer web browser could be leveraged
against phishers in order to attack vulnerabilites of the phisher’s host. For possible defenses a larger database of phisher IP addresses could be used to create black lists within
web browsers to block access to potential phishers. This black list could also be used by
financial institutions as a red flag if account information is accessed from one of these IP
addresses. Other possible vulnerabilites and defenses could possibly be inferred from the
results information detailed in Section 4.2.

5.2

Future Research
Future work on this project should go further than just the HTML form of phishing

schemes. By looking at the server that was compromised to host the attack, vulnerabilities
that were exploited could be determined.
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While looking at different phishing schemes, it was noticed that the directory structure of the schemes were very similar. This is due to the fact that phishers use premade
‘kits’ to set up their schemes across a large number of systems. By communicating with
administrators of the compromised host after a phishing site is taken down, these phishing
kits could be recovered and studied for other insights into phishing schemes. In addition
to insights into phishing schemes, the phishing kits could be studied for exploits and other
vulnerabilities in their code.
Web bugs are not the only way to exploit web browsers and other client software used
for viewing results of phishing schemes. Other exploits in these types of software can
be studied as well to use in tracking down the source of phishing schemes. As discussed
in the previous section, vulnerabilities of a particular operating system, web browser, or
scripting language could be explored as futher attacks against phishing as well as future
defenses using other results data.
As mentioned previously, automating the process was unsuccessful. If this were addressed in future work, it is possible that greater success could be achieved. This would
allow the process to be used on a larger scale against a much larger data set.
Lastly, this process could possibly be applied to other computer security areas as well.
One example of this would be to embed web bugs into a Nigerian 411 scam reply e-mail.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT PERL SOURCE CODE
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A.1

automate.pl

#!/usr/bin/perl
use
use
use
use

strict;
LWP::Simple;
LWP::UserAgent;
File::Copy;

#####################################################
#Create new gif and html files for this particular
#phish attack.
#####################################################
my $ur` = @ARGV[0];
my $root url;
if($ur` =˜ m/(http:\/\/(.+\/)+)/cgi) {
$root url = $1;
}
my @mArray = ("Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May","Jun",
"Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec");
my
my
my
my
my
my

$mon = (localtime)[4];
$date = (localtime)[3]+1;
$year = (localtime)[5]+1900;
$hour = (localtime)[2];
$min = (localtime)[1];
$sec = (localtime)[0];

my $date time = $year."_".$mArray[$mon]."_"
.$date."_".$hour."_".$min."_".$sec;
my $temp`ateGIFFi`e = "/var/www/html/images/template.gif";
my $gif file
= $date time.".gif";
my $newGIFFi`e
= "/var/www/html/images/".$gif file;
my $temp`ateHTMLFi`e = "/var/www/html/index.html";
my $htm` file
= $date time.".html";
my $newHTMLFi`e = "/var/www/html/html_files/".$htm` file;
copy($temp`ateGIFFi`e,$newGIFFi`e);
copy($temp`ateHTMLFi`e,$newHTMLFi`e);
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Add new attack to database file siteData.csv
#####################################################
open(DB,"+>> siteData.csv");
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my $data = $ur`.",".$date time.",auto\n";
print DB $data | | die "Could not write to file.\n";
close(DB);
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Parse remote html file for form data.
Do this up
#to 3 times as long as the result is a form.
#####################################################
system("rm","-f","./output_html.txt");
open(HTML,"+>> output_html.txt");
my $action root;
my $form count = 1;
my $form flag = 1;
print "URL is $url.\n";
while(($form flag) && ($form count <= 3)) {
if($form count == 1) {
my $htm`
= get($ur`)
or die "Couldn’t open URL.";
my $htm` orig = $htm`;
print HTML $htm`;
close(HTML);
}
open(HTML,"< output_html.txt")
or die "Couldn’t open URL file.";
my
my
my
my
my

$action url;
$method;
@input names;
@types;
@values;

print "Starting while loop.\n";
while(my $`ine = readline(HTML)) {
if($`ine =˜
m/<form.*method\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w{3,4})[\"\’]?/i) {
$method = $1;
print "Method is $method.\n";
}
if($line =˜
m/action\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w*\.\w*)[\"\’]?/i) {
$action_root = $1;
$action_url = $root_url.$action_root;
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print "Action is $action url.\n";
print "Action Root is $action root.\n";
}
if($line =˜ m/\<input/i) {
my $input_type = 0;
my $input_value = 0;
do {
if($line =˜
m/type\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w+)[\"\’]?/i) {
push @types,$1;
print "Input type is $1.\n";
$input_type = 1;
}
if($line =˜
m/value\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w+)[\"\’]?/i) {
push @values,$1;
print "Input value is $1.\n";
$input_value = 1;
}
if($line =˜
m/name\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w+)[\"\’]?/i) {
push @input_names,$1;
print "Input name is $1.\n";
}
if($input_type == 0) {
push @types,"text";
}
if($input_value == 0) {
push @values," ";
}
$line = readline(HTML);
} while($line !˜ m/>/i)
}
if($line =˜
m/<select\s*name\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w+)[\"\’]?.*
<option.*<option\.*value\s*=\s*[\"\’]?(\w+)
[\"\’]?/cgi) {
push(@types,"select");
push(@input_names,$1);
push(@values,$2);
print "Select statment type, name, value ";
print "equals select, $1, $2.\n";
}
}
close(HTML);
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Creating form values for form submission
my $size = @input_names;
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my $form_values = "?";
my $input_flag = 0;
for(my $i=0; $i<$size; $i++) {
print "Current type is $types[$i].\n";
if(($types[$i] eq "hidden")
| | ($types[$i] eq "checkbox")) {
$form_values .= "$input names[$i]=$va`ues[$i]&";
}
elsif (($types[$i] eq "text") | |
($types[$i] eq "Text") | |
($types[$i] eq "password") | |
($types[$i] eq "Password")) {
if($input_flag) {
$form_values .= "$input names[$i]=
%3Cimg%20src=\%22http%3A%2F%2F130%2E18%2E5%2E11%2F
images%2F$gif file\%22%3E&";
}
else {
$form_values .= "$input names[$i]=
%3Ca%20href=\%22http%3A%2F%2F130%2E18%2E5%2E11%2F
html%5Ffi`es%2f$htm` file\%22%3Emyspam\@hotmail.com
%3C%2Fa%3E&";
}
$input_flag = !$input_flag;
}
}
chop $form_values;
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Autofilling form with html tags
if($method eq "POST" | | $method eq "post") {
my $str_length = length($form_values);
my $post_values = substr($form_values,1,
$str_length);
print "Submitting POST data $post values\n";
system("wget","−O","output html.txt","−−post−data",
"$post values","$action url");
}
elsif($method eq "GET" | | $method eq "get") {
my $new_url = $action_url.$form_values;
print "Submitting GET data $new url.\n";
system("wget","−O","output html.txt","$new url");
}
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Checking output to see if we still have a form
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sysopen(NEW_PAGE,"./output html.txt","O RDONLY") | |
die "Could not open new form.\n";
while(my $line = readline(NEW_PAGE)) {
if($line =˜ m/<form/cgi) {
$form_flag = 1;
last;
}
else {
$form_flag = 0;
}
}
$form_count++;
}
#####################################################
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A.2

imagesetup.pl

#!/usr/bin/perl
use
use
use
use

strict;
LWP::Simple;
LWP::UserAgent;
File::Copy;

#####################################################
# Create new gif and html files for this particular
# phish attack.
#####################################################
my $url = @ARGV[0];
my $rootUrl;
if($url =˜ m/(http:\/\/(.+\/)+)/cgi) {
$rootUrl = $1;
}
my @mArray = ("Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May","Jun",
"Jul","Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec");
my
my
my
my
my
my

$mon = (localtime)[4];
$date = (localtime)[3]+1;
$year = (localtime)[5]+1900;
$hour = (localtime)[2];
$min = (localtime)[1];
$sec = (localtime)[0];

my $dateTime = $year."_".$mArray[$mon]."_".$date.
"_".$hour."_".$min."_".$sec;
my $templateGIFFile = "/var/www/html/images/template.gif";
my $gifFile = $dateTime.".gif";
my $newGIFFile
= "/var/www/html/images/".$gifFile;
my $templateHTMLFile = "/var/www/html/index.html";
my $htmlFile
= $dateTime.".html";
my $newHTMLFile
= "/var/www/html/html_files/".$htmlFile;
copy($templateGIFFile,$newGIFFile);
copy($templateHTMLFile,$newHTMLFile);
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Add new attack to database file siteData.csv
#####################################################
open(DB,"+>> siteData.csv");
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my $data = $url.",".$dateTime.",man\n";
print DB $data | | die "Could not write to file.\n";
close(DB);
#####################################################
#####################################################
#Print out form field values to cut and paste into
#the form.
#####################################################
print "Image tag is ";
print "<img src=’http://130.18.5.11/images/";
print "$gifFile’>\n";
print "Image tag in hex code is ";
print "%3Cimg+src%3D%27http%3A%2F%2F";
print "130.18.5.11%2Fimages%2F$gifFile%27%3E\n";
print "HTML tag is ";
print "<a href=’http://130.18.5.11/htmlFiles/
print "$htmlFile’>myspam\@hotmail.com</a>\n";
print "HTML tag in hex code is ";
print "%3Ca+href%3D%27http%3A%2F%2F130.18.5.11%2F";
print "html_files%2F$htmlFile%27%3E";
print "myspam\@hotmail.com%3C%2Fa%3E\n";
#####################################################
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APPENDIX B
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT HTML/PHP SOURCE CODE
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B.1

phishFormGet.php

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML
4.01 Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<title>Phishing Test Form</title>
<meta http−equiv="content-type"
content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body>
<?php
$submit = $ POST[’submit’];
if($submit == ’y’) {
$name = $ POST[’name’];
$emai` = $ POST[’email’];
$query = "INSERT INTO project
VALUES (’$name’,’$email’)";
$connection = mysql connect(’localhost’, ’etsumc’,
’etfwb32547’);
mysql select db(’etsumc_cal’, $connection);
if((mysql query($query, $connection)) &&
mysql affected rows() == 1)
echo "<center><font size=\"3\">";
echo "Information Successfully Added.";
echo "</font></center>";
else
echo "<center><font size=\"3\">";
echo "Information NOT Successfully Added.";
echo "</font></center>";
}
?>
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<center><h1>
<form action="phish_form_post.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="submit" value="y">
<table border="0">
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
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<td><input type="text" name="name"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E−mail:</td>
<td><input type="text" name="email"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td><input type="submit"></td>
</tr>
</table>
</form>
</h1></center>
</body>
</html>
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B.2

phishFormPost.php

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01
Transitional//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">
<html>
<head>
<title>Phishing Test Form</title>
<meta http−equiv="content-type"
content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body>
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<center><h1>
<form action="phish_form_get.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="submit" value="y">
<table border="0">
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td><input type="text" name="name"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E−mail:</td>
<td><input type="text" name="email"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td><input type="submit"></td>
</tr>
</table>
</form>
</h1></center>
</body>
</html>

46

B.3

showDB.php

<HTML>
<BODY>
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />
<table align="center" border="0">
<center><h1>Project Test:
<?php
$query = "SELECT * FROM project";
$connection = mysql connect(’localhost’, ’etsumc’,
’etfwb32547’);
mysql select db(’etsumc_cal’, $connection);
$resu`t = mysql query($query, $connection);
while($row = mysql fetch row($resu`t)) {
echo "<tr><td>$row[0] $row[1]</td></tr>\n";
}
?>
</h1></center>
</table>
</BODY>
</HTML>
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APPENDIX C
ATTEMPTED AUTOMATION PYTHON SOURCE CODE
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C.1

automateDQ.py

#!/usr/bin/python
import filecmp
import
import
import
import

os
re
string
urllib

#Used for file comparison to see if
#the same page is encountered
#imports os libraries
#imports regular expression library
#imports web libraries

from HTMLParser import HTMLParser
from time import localtime, strftime

#Used for processing HTML files
#imports time libraries

class MyHTMLParser(HTMLParser):
actionField
= ""
currentSelectField = ""
foundForm
= 0
methodField
= ""
optionCount
= 0
params
= {}
def handle starttag(self, tag, attrs):
if tag == "form":
MyHTMLParser.foundForm = 1
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "action":
MyHTMLParser.actionField = value[1]
if value[0] == "method":
MyHTMLParser.methodField = value[1]
elif tag == "input":
inputVal
= ""
nameValue = ""
typeValue = ""
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "name":
nameValue = value[1]
elif value[0] == "type":
typeValue = value[1]
elif value[0] == "value":
inputVal = value[1]
typeValList = (typeValue,inputVal)
MyHTMLParser.params[nameValue] = typeValList
elif tag == "select":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "name":
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MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField = value[1]
elif tag == "option":
if MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField != "":
MyHTMLParser.optionCount = MyHTMLParser.optionCount+1
selectFieldValue = ""
if MyHTMLParser.optionCount == 2:
if MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField != "":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "value":
selectFieldValue = value[1]
MyHTMLParser.params[MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField] =
selectFieldValue
MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField = ""
MyHTMLParser.optionCount = 0
infile=open(’./newAttacks.csv’,’r’) #list of new attacks
for phish in infile:
m
= string.split(phish,’,’)
url = m[0]
site = m[1]

#Look at each phishing attack
#Get URL from infile
#Get business being exploited

site = site.rstrip(’\n’)
filename = strftime("%Y_%m_%d_%H_%M_%S", localtime())
filename = filename+’_dq’
outfileName = ’./’+filename+’/log.txt’
os.system("mkdir %s" % (filename))
outfile = open(outfileName,’w’)
outfile.write(’URL is ’+url+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Site is ’+site+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Filename is ’+filename+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Outfile name is ’+outfileName+’\n’)
#########################################################
#Get directory structure from url for relative pathnames#
#
in the action field
#
#########################################################
m = re.search("http://((.*/)*)",url,re.IGNORECASE)
if m:
actionRoot = m.group(1)
actionRoot = ’http://’+actionRoot
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#########################################################
#Create new gif files and html files for this particular#
#Create new gif files and html files for this particular#
#
phishing attack
#
#########################################################
gifTemplate = ’/var/www/html/images/template.gif’
gifNewfile
= ’/var/www/html/images/’+filename+’_auto.gif’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (gifTemplate,gifNewfile))
htmlTemplate = ’/var/www/html/html_files/template.html’
htmlNewfile = ’/var/www/html/html_files/’+filename+’_auto.html’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (htmlTemplate,htmlNewfile))
##########################################################
# Writes url, site exploited, and filename to logfile
#
#
for reference later
#
##########################################################
datafile = open(’./investigationList.csv’,’a’)
out = url+’,’+site+’,’+filename
datafile.write(out)
datafile.write(’\n’)
datafile.close
##########################################################
#
Creates links for form submission
#
##########################################################
htmlLink = ’<a href="http://130.18.5.11/html_files/’+filename+’_auto.html">
myspam@hotmail.com</a>’
htmlHex = urllib.quote(htmlLink)
imageLink = ’<img src="http://130.18.5.11/images/’+filename+’_auto.jpg">’
imageHex = urllib.quote(imageLink)
##########################################################
#
Stores url locally for parsing
#
##########################################################
count = 1;

#Keeps up with the number of pages
#being processed.
Used in filenames
#for html files stored locally

countString = repr(count);

#Converts count to a string

localFN = ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
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urllib.urlretrieve(url,localFN)
#Stores html file into a local file
##########################################################
#
Parses local file to get html form parameters
#
##########################################################
fileExtListFile = open(’./fileExtensions.csv’,’w’)
m = re.search("/(.*?\. .*?)$",url,re.IGNORECASE)
if m:
fileExtListFile.write(m.group(1))
fileExtListFile.write(’\n’)
processForm = 1
while processForm:
httpFile = open(localFN,’r’)
p = MyHTMLParser ( )
outfile.write(’Parsing the file ========’+localFN+’\n’)
p.feed(httpFile.read())
if not p.foundForm:
processForm = 0
else:
##########################################################
#
Creates name=value pairs for form submission
#
##########################################################
dataDict = {}
htmlImage = 0

#Boolean variable to swap between html and image tags

for key in p.params.keys():
dictList = p.params[key]
if "hidden" == dictList[0]:
dataDict[key] = dictList[1]
else:
phoneNo = re.search("phone",key,re.IGNORECASE)
if phoneNo:
dataDict[key] = "5555555555"
else:
if htmlImage:
dataDict[key] = imageHex
htmlImage = 0
else:
dataDict[key] = htmlHex
htmlImage = 1
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##########################################################
#
Submits data to next web page
#
##########################################################
count = count+1
actionValue = p.actionField
httpSearch = re.search("http://",actionValue,re.IGNORECASE)
prevLocalFN = localFN
if not httpSearch:
actionValue = actionRoot+actionValue
outfile.write(’Action value is ’+actionValue+’\n’)
methodField = string.upper(p.methodField)
outfile.write(methodField+’****************************************\n’)
if "POST" == methodField:
request
= urllib.urlencode(dataDict)
newWebHandle = urllib.urlopen(actionValue, request)
countString
= repr(count);
#Converts count to a string
localFN
= ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
newHttpFile = open(localFN,’w’)
while 1:
data = newWebHandle.read(512)
if not data:
break
newHttpFile.write(data)
newHttpFile.close()
newWebHandle.close()
else:
request
newPage

= urllib.urlencode(dataDict)
= actionValue+’?’+request

newWebHandle = urllib.urlopen(newPage)
countString
= str(count);
#Converts count to a string
localFN
= ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
urllib.urlretrieve(newPage,localFN)
httpFile.close
urllib.urlcleanup()

#Cleans up cache from urlretrieve calls

outfile.write(prevLocalFN+’and’+localFN+’\n’)
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if filecmp.cmp(prevLocalFN,localFN):
outfile.write(’Equal Files\n’)
processForm = 0
#p.foundForm = 0
outfile.write(’COUNT IS =======’+countString+’\n’)
if count == 6:
processForm = 0
#End of ’if not p.foundForm’ loop
#End of ’while processLoop’ loop
fileExtListFile.close()
#End of ’for phish in infile’ loop
infile.close
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C.2

automateSQ.py

#!/usr/bin/python
import filecmp
import
import
import
import

os
re
string
urllib

#Used for file comparison to see if
#the same page is encountered
#imports os libraries
#imports regular expression library
#imports web libraries

from HTMLParser import HTMLParser
from time import localtime, strftime

#Used for processing HTML files
#imports time libraries

class MyHTMLParser(HTMLParser):
actionField
= ""
currentSelectField = ""
foundForm
= 0
methodField
= ""
optionCount
= 0
params
= {}
def handle starttag(self, tag, attrs):
if tag == "frame":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "src":
MyHTMLParser.actionField = value[1]
elif tag == "form":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "action":
MyHTMLParser.actionField = value[1]
if value[0] == "method":
MyHTMLParser.methodField = value[1]
elif tag == "input":
inputVal
= ""
nameValue = ""
typeValue = ""
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "name":
nameValue = value[1]
elif value[0] == "type":
typeValue = value[1]
elif value[0] == "value":
inputVal = value[1]
typeValList = (typeValue,inputVal)
MyHTMLParser.params[nameValue] = typeValList
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elif tag == "select":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "name":
MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField = value[1]
elif tag == "option":
if MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField != "":
MyHTMLParser.optionCount = MyHTMLParser.optionCount+1
selectFieldValue = ""
if MyHTMLParser.optionCount == 2:
if MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField != "":
for value in attrs:
if value[0] == "value":
selectFieldValue = value[1]
MyHTMLParser.params[MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField] =
selectFieldValue
MyHTMLParser.currentSelectField = ""
MyHTMLParser.optionCount = 0
infile=open(’./newAttacks.csv’,’r’) #list of new attacks
for phish in infile:
m
= string.split(phish,’,’)
url = m[0]
site = m[1]

#Look at each phishing attack
#Get URL from infile
#Get business being exploited

filename = strftime("%Y_%m_%d_%H_%M_%S", localtime())
filename = filename+’_sq’
outfileName = filename+’/log.txt’
os.system("mkdir %s" % (filename))
outfile = open(outfileName,’w’)
outfile.write(’URL is’+url+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Site is’+site+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Filename is’+filename+’\n’)
outfile.write(’Outfile is’+outfileName+’\n’)
#########################################################
#Get directory structure from url for relative pathnames#
#
in the action field
#
#########################################################
m = re.search("http://((.*/)*)",url,re.IGNORECASE)
if m:
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actionRoot = m.group(1)
actionRoot = ’http://’+actionRoot
#########################################################
#Create new gif files and html files for this particular#
#
phishing attack
#
#########################################################
gifTemplate = ’/var/www/html/images/template.gif’
gifNewfile
= ’/var/www/html/images/’+filename+’_auto.gif’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (gifTemplate,gifNewfile))
htmlTemplate = ’/var/www/html/html_files/template.html’
htmlNewfile = ’/var/www/html/html_files/’+filename+’_auto.html’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (htmlTemplate,htmlNewfile))
##########################################################
# Writes url, site exploited, and filename to logfile
#
#
for reference later
#
##########################################################
datafile = open(’./investigationList.csv’,’a’)
out = url+’,’+site+’,’+filename
datafile.write(out)
datafile.write(’\n’)
datafile.close
###########################################################
#
Downloads whois query of the compromised webserver
#
###########################################################
whoisFile = ’./’+filename+’/whois.txt’
os.system("whois %s > %s" % (url,whoisFile))
###########################################################
#
Takes whois query and logs the physical address
#
###########################################################
whoisLogFile = open(’./serverLoc.csv’,’a’)
whoisFH
= open(whoisFile,’r’)
for line in whoisFH:
m = re.search("ˆaddress:\s*(.*)",line,re.IGNORECASE)
if m:
whoisLogFile.write(m.group(1))
else:
m2 = re.search("ˆrole:\s*(.*)",line,re.IGNORECASE)
if m2:
roleLine = 1
whoisLogFile.write(m2.group(1),re.IGNORECASE)
else:
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roleLine = 0
m3 = re.search("ˆperson:\s*(.*)",line,re.IGNORECASE)
if m3:
personLine = 1
whoisLogFile.write(m3.group(1))
else:
personLine = 0
whoisLogFile.close()
whoisFH.close()
##########################################################
#
Creates links for form submission
#
##########################################################
htmlLink = "<a href=’http://130.18.5.11/html_files/"+filename+"_auto.html’>
myspam@hotmail.com</a>"
htmlHex = urllib.quote(htmlLink)
imageLink = "<img src=’http://130.18.5.11/images/"+filename+"_auto.jpg’>"
imageHex = urllib.quote(imageLink)
##########################################################
#
Stores url locally for parsing
#
##########################################################
count = 1;

#Keeps up with the number of pages
#being processed.
Used in filenames
#for html files stored locally

countString = repr(count);

#Converts count to a string

localFN = ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
urllib.urlretrieve(url,localFN)
#Stores html file into a local file
##########################################################
#
Parses local file to get html form parameters
#
##########################################################
fileExtListFile = open(’./fileExtensions.csv’,’w’)
m = re.search("/(.*?\. .*?)$",url,re.IGNORECASE)
if m:
fileExtListFile.write(m.group(1))
fileExtListFile.write(’\n’)

58

processForm = 1
while processForm:
httpFile = open(localFN,’r’)
p = MyHTMLParser ( )
outfile.write(’Parsing the file ========’+localFN+’\n’)
p.feed(httpFile.read())
##########################################################
#
Creates name=value pairs for form submission
#
##########################################################
dataDict = {}
htmlImage = 0

#Boolean variable to swap between html and image tags

for key in p.params.keys():
dictList = p.params[key]
if "hidden" == dictList[0]:
dataDict[key] = dictList[1]
else:
phoneNo = re.search("phone",key,re.IGNORECASE)
if phoneNo:
dataDict[key] = "5555555555"
else:
if htmlImage:
dataDict[key] = imageHex
htmlImage = 0
else:
dataDict[key] = htmlHex
htmlImage = 1
#########################################################
#
Submits data to next web page
#
##########################################################
count = count+1
actionValue = p.actionField
httpSearch = re.search("http://",actionValue,re.IGNORECASE)
prevLocalFN = localFN
if not httpSearch:
actionValue = actionRoot+actionValue
methodField = string.upper(p.methodField)
outfile.write(methodField+’****************************************\n’)
if "POST" == methodField:
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outfile.write(’Action value is ’+actionValue+’\n’)
request
= urllib.urlencode(dataDict)
newWebHandle = urllib.urlopen(actionValue, request)
countString
= repr(count);
#Converts count to a string
localFN
= ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
newHttpFile = open(localFN,’w’)
while 1:
data = newWebHandle.read(512)
if not data:
break
newHttpFile.write(data)
newHttpFile.close()
newWebHandle.close()
else:
request
newPage

= urllib.urlencode(dataDict)
= actionValue+’?’+request

newWebHandle = urllib.urlopen(newPage)
countString
= str(count);
#Converts count to a string
localFN
= ’./’+filename+’/’+countString+’.html’
urllib.urlretrieve(newPage,localFN)
httpFile.close
urllib.urlcleanup()

#Cleans up cache from urlretrieve calls

outfile.write(prevLocalFN+’ and ’+localFN+’\n’)
if filecmp.cmp(prevLocalFN,localFN):
outfile.write("Equal Files\n")
processForm = 0
#p.foundForm = 0
outfile.write(’COUNT IS =======’+countString+’\n’)
if count == 6:
processForm = 0
#End of ’while processLoop’ loop
fileExtListFile.close()
#End of ’for phish in infile’ loop
infile.close
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APPENDIX D
FINAL EXPERIMENT PYTHON SOURCE CODE
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D.1

imagesetupDQ.py

#!/usr/bin/python
import os
import string
from time import localtime, strftime
import urllib

#imports os libraries
#imports time libraries

infile=open(’./newAttacks.csv’,’r’) #list of new attacks
for phish in infile:
m=string.split(phish,’,’)
url=m[0]
site=m[1]
print ’URL is’,url
print ’Site is’,site

#Look at each phishing attack
#Get URL from infile
#Get business being exploited

filename = strftime("%Y_%b_%d_%H_%M_%S", localtime())
filename = filename+’_dq’
print ’Filename is’,filename
#########################################################
#Create new gif files and html files for this particular#
#
phishing attack
#
#########################################################
gifTemplate=’/var/www/html/images/template.gif’
gifNewfile=’/var/www/html/images/’+filename+’_man.gif’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (gifTemplate,gifNewfile))
htmlTemplate=’/var/www/html/html_files/template.html’
htmlNewfile=’/var/www/html/html_files/’+filename+’_man.html’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (htmlTemplate,htmlNewfile))
########################################################
#Writes url and filename to logfile for reference later#
########################################################
datafile=open(’./siteData.csv’,’w’)
out=url+’,’+filename
datafile.write(out)
datafile.close
##############################################
#Print out html tags to use in phisher’s form#
##############################################
html reg = ’<a href="http://130.18.207.5/html_files/’+filename+’_man.html">
myspam@hotmail.com</a>’
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print "HTML link is "
print html reg
html hex = urllib.quote(html reg)
print "HTML link in hex code is "
print html hex
img reg = ’<img src="http://130.18.207.5/images/’+filename+’_man.gif">’
print "IMG tag is "
print img reg
img hex = urllib.quote(img reg)
print "IMG tag in hex code is "
print img hex
#End of ’for phish in infile’ loop
infile.close
os.remove(’./newAttacks.csv’)
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D.2

imagesetupSQ.py

#!/usr/bin/python
import os
import string
from time import localtime, strftime
import urllib

#imports os libraries
#imports time libraries

infile=open(’./newAttacks.csv’,’r’) #list of new attacks
for phish in infile:
m=string.split(phish,’,’)
url=m[0]
site=m[1]
print ’URL is’,url
print ’Site is’,site

#Look at each phishing attack
#Get URL from infile
#Get business being exploited

filename = strftime("%Y_%b_%d_%H_%M_%S", localtime())
filename = filename+’_sq’
print ’Filename is’,filename
#########################################################
#Create new gif files and html files for this particular#
#
phishing attack
#
#########################################################
gifTemplate=’/var/www/html/images/template.gif’
gifNewfile=’/var/www/html/images/’+filename+’_man.gif’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (gifTemplate,gifNewfile))
htmlTemplate=’/var/www/html/html_files/template.html’
htmlNewfile=’/var/www/html/html_files/’+filename+’_man.html’
os.system("cp %s %s" % (htmlTemplate,htmlNewfile))
########################################################
#Writes url and filename to logfile for reference later#
########################################################
datafile=open(’./siteData.csv’,’w’)
out=url+’,’+filename
datafile.write(out)
datafile.close
##############################################
#Print out html tags to use in phisher’s form#
##############################################
html reg = "<a href=’http://130.18.207.5/html_files/"+filename+"_man.html’>
myspam@hotmail.com</a>"
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print "HTML link is "
print html reg
print "HTML link is "
print html reg
html hex = urllib.quote(html reg)
print "HTML link in hex code is "
print html hex
img reg = "<img src=’http://130.18.207.5/images/"+filename+"_man.gif’>"
print "IMG tag is "
print img reg
img hex = urllib.quote(img reg)
print "IMG tag in hex code is "
print img hex
#End of ’for phish in infile’ loop
infile.close
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APPENDIX E
INVESTIGATION DATA
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Table E.1
Phishing Sites Investigated
Case No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Site
http://fr.ebayobjects.com/6k%3Bh=http://3731128842:82/ebayISAPII.dll-cgi/index.php
http://mckim.skhu.ac.kr/bbs/data/ai/1115632907/.military/efs/servlet/military/
http://signin.ebay.com.1234.tty.btd.com.sg/ws/eBayISAPI.php?cmd=SignIn&co_partnerId=2&pUserId=&
siteid=0&pageType=&pa1=&i1=&bshowgif=&UsingSSL=&ru=&pp=&pa2=&errmsg=&runame=
http://towernet.capitalonebank.com.id22crlsdu.sing34.biz/verify/customerservice/formpage.html
http://210.66.55.11/Images/paypal/index.htm
http://www.liceymum.ru/images/smilies/index.htm
http://moneywireinc.selfip.net/paypal.html
http://75.23.0.9/MembersLogin/index.htm
http://1358148044/%66%61%6D%69%6C%79/media.renamed.vunerable/.https:/capitalone.com/login.php?/
objectclicked=navcustomercarelink&source=recentactivity&SID=200002227628582
http://www.burninggirlsonline.com/pics/cmd-run=/login.htm
http://intopsgroup.net/skin/red/mainimg/netbank.com.au/aubank/www3.netbank.commbank.com.au/update/index.htm
http://212.62.47.196//.Artikelnummer/18993457382/bitteEinloggen/index.php
http://moneymanagergps-id774144343.citizensbank.com.pal-neto.cn/gps/userdir/onlineform.aspx/
http://69.95.145.147:443/us.etrade.com/login.htm?Survey
http://www.sanorga.de/rdx/cache/index.html?ssl=promos/jump/checking/
?cm_sp=ThankYou-Checking-_-Free%20Checking%20with%20Direct%20Deposit-_-Open%20SignOn
http://www.un3.net/imgbay/uploads/confirm-paypal/
http://61.19.233.130/˜saifon/%20%20/mid/step1.html
http://207.36.160.15/icons/.../www.bankofamerica.com/sslencrypt218bit/online_banking/
http://onlinesession-724822614.natwest.com.palvica131.cn/updatemode/userdatadirectory/start.aspx/
http://surgicalservicesinternational.com/editables/flash/lipo/module.dll.php?
customerid=rod@bradbury.worldonline.co.uk&co_partnerId=2&siteid=0&ru=&PageName=login_run&
pp=pass&pageType=708XeMWZllWXS3AlBXVShqAhQRfhgTDrf=
https://signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&UsingSSL=1&pUserId=&co_partnerId=2&siteid=0&ru=&pp=&
pageType=708&MfcISAPICommand=ConfirmRegistration&708XeMWZllWXS3AlBXVShqAhQRfhgTDrfQRfhgTDrfA
http://www.takemetothewu.com/x/View.htm
http://210.60.133.203/icons/small/ps1.gif/signin.ebay.com/ws/ebayISPP.dll/SignIn/
http://teencreek.org/phpBB2/language/lang_english/timbre/index1.php
http://moneymanagergps-id713480.citizensbank.com.oida17.cn/gps/userdir/onlineform.aspx/
http://66.49.130.245/˜martin/-/PayPal/updates/us/webscr.php?cmd=_login-run
http://fondolisiados.gob.sv/error/include/capitalone/info.htm
http://wvps212-241-211-27.vps.webfusion.co.uk/www.halifax-online.co.uk/_mem_bin/
formslogin.asp_source=halifaxcoukHOME/
http://64.150.167.151/addssd/
http://diata.dk/modules/mod_as_category/images/service.htm
http://est-213-228-152-145.netvisao.pt/fonts/www.signin.ebay.com/beware.buyer.html
http://www.cnmd.org/bbs/.secure_ssl30/33.swf/militarybankonline.bankofamerica/efs/servlet/
military/login.htm?id=1191071916
http://v1338.ncsrv.de:84/bankofamerica/
http://home.frv.fr/dot/amazon.com/index.htm
http://securelogin-26805221.moneymanagergps.com.gts72.com/Online_Form.htm
http://id-199044007.citizensbankmoneymanagergps.com.bk4ft.zj.cn/securepage/challenge.aspx/
http://payrhpal.com/
http://78.38.172.3/citadel/
http://onlinesession-51728.natwest.com.miloe2r.zj.cn/updatemode/userdatadirectory/start.aspx/
http://140.8.233.220.exetel.com.au/.www.paypal.com/webscr.php?cmd=_login-run
http://www.csifanclub.com/coppermine/albums/userpics/newdir1/albacaza.htm
http://ernest-industries.com/Upload/webscrcmd=_account-run%5Cupdates-paypal%5Cconfirm-paypal/
http://signin.cgi3.com.wsbayisapi.dll.co-partnerid.signinusingssl.powersellers-cgi5bay.com.istemp.com/cgi/
www.ebay.com/3FMyeBay20pp-20pa220errmsg2runameruparams-ruproduct-sidfavoritenavconfirm0ebxPageTypeexisting
Email20isCheckoutmigrateVisitor1SignIn/login.html
http://www.broeske.com/barb/www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/online-security=paypal/cgi-bin=_connexion/
online_security=information/webscrcmd=_login-run/webscrcmd=_account-run/updates-paypal/
confirm-paypal/update.php
http://www.motoplus.ro/sitemap/cgi-bin/webscrcmd/update.php
http://securelogin-22072011.moneymanagergps.com.fcf18.com/login.htm
http://paythpal.com/
http://217.17.228.148:82/eBaySignIn-eBayISAPI/
signin.ebay.com_ws_eBayISAPI.dllSignIn%20ru=http=www.ebay.com.htm
http://www.brugro.nl/%20./index.html
http://85.25.48.26:84/cascades/index.htm?ssl=433
http://w0qqrromzr4qqsacatz133236qwqsocm.smtp.ru/Great-Dell-C600-P3-laptop-CDROM-FDD-AC-complete.htm
http://59.188.28.202/index.htm
http://www.unl.edu.ec/feue/cache/p/
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Table E.2
Phishing Sites Data
Case No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Site IP
222.100.130. 10
203.246.275.102
77. 97.226. 19
58. 81.164. 82
210. 66. 55. 11
81.222.134. 49
71.109.252.214
75. 23. 0. 9
80.243.177.204
72.232. 72. 98
210.223.132. 1
212. 62. 47.196
60. 12.130.112
69. 95.145.147
62. 26.185.250
208. 67.253. 2
61. 19.233.130
207. 36.160. 15
200. 77.213. 15
72. 9.251. 74
216. 39. 58.194
210. 60.133.203
38.113.185.219
60. 12.130.112
66. 49.130.245
168.243.199. 98
212.241.211. 27
64.150.167.151
212. 70. 21. 86
213.228.152.145
61.100. 9.211
89.110.149.177
82.165.119. 76
87. 20. 15.141
219.253.140.172
216. 39. 58.235
78. 38.172. 3
219.253.140.172
220.233. 8.140
64.202.166.214
69. 89. 21. 81
64.136. 25.175
65.254. 74. 81
208.109.181. 24
58.140. 85.112
216. 39. 58.207
217. 17.228.148
62.193.248. 62
85. 25. 48. 26
82.204.219.231
59.188. 28.202
192.188. 49. 2

Phishing Site Location
Korea
Korea
Netherlands
Japan
Taiwan
Russia
United States
United States
United Kingdom
United States
Korea
Serbia & Montenegro
Austrailia
United States
Germany
United States
Thailand
United States
Mexico
United States
United States
Taiwan
United States
Australia
Canada
San Salvador
United Kingdom
United States
Denmark
Portugal
Korea
Netherlands
Germany
Netherlands
Korea
United States
Netherlands
Korea
Australia
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
Australia
United States
Bahrain
France
Netherlands
Russia
Australia
Ecuador

Investigation Filenames
2007_Jun_20_11_28_52_dq, 2007_Jun_20_11_29_53_sq
2007_Jun_21_16_36_13_dq, 2007_Jun_21_16_36_22_sq
2007_Jun_30_21_33_57_dq, 2007_Jun_30_21_34_13_sq
2007_Jul_04_13_25_16_dq, 2007_Jul_04_13_25_26_sq
2007_Jul_04_13_58_47_dq, 2007_Jul_04_13_59_05_sq
2007_Jul_17_21_37_59_dq, 2007_Jul_17_21_38_06_sq
2007_Aug_02_20_48_26_dq, 2007_Aug_02_20_48_31_sq
2007_Aug_02_20_58_03_dq, 2007_Aug_02_20_58_08_sq
2007_Aug_08_19_05_49_dq, 2007_Aug_08_19_05_55_sq
2007_Aug_08_19_20_34_dq, 2007_Aug_08_19_20_48_sq
2007_Aug_08_19_41_20_dq, 2007_Aug_08_19_41_32_sq
2007_Aug_08_19_54_35_dq, 2007_Aug_08_19_54_46_sq
2007_Sep_10_20_14_12_dq, 2007_Sep_10_20_14_20_sq
2007_Sep_10_20_30_13_dq, 2007_Sep_10_20_30_20_sq
2007_Sep_10_20_43_39_dq, 2007_Sep_10_20_43_46_sq
2007_Sep_16_15_11_05_dq, 2007_Sep_16_15_11_14_sq
2007_Sep_16_15_24_28_dq, 2007_Sep_16_15_24_35_sq
2007_Sep_16_15_32_18_dq, 2007_Sep_16_15_32_22_sq
2007_Sep_16_15_57_26_dq, 2007_Sep_16_15_57_37_sq
2007_Sep_16_16_17_44_dq, 2007_Sep_16_16_17_54_sq
2007_Sep_17_20_05_23_dq, 2007_Sep_17_20_05_30_sq
2007_Sep_17_20_20_42_dq, 2007_Sep_17_20_20_46_sq
2007_Sep_17_20_38_44_dq, 2007_Sep_17_20_38_49_sq
2007_Sep_17_21_04_04_dq, 2007_Sep_17_21_04_14_sq
2007_Sep_17_21_22_34_dq, 2007_Sep_17_21_22_40_sq
2007_Sep_28_20_13_44_dq, 2007_Sep_28_20_13_52_sq
2007_Sep_28_21_47_47_dq, 2007_Sep_28_21_47_53_sq
2007_Sep_28_21_57_36_dq, 2007_Sep_28_21_58_01_sq
2007_Sep_28_22_12_37_dq, 2007_Sep_28_22_12_45_sq
2007_Sep_29_07_46_44_dq, 2007_Sep_29_07_46_50_sq
2007_Sep_29_08_08_25_dq, 2007_Sep_29_08_08_33_sq
2007_Sep_29_08_26_21_dq, 2007_Sep_29_08_26_28_sq
2007_Sep_29_08_40_11_dq, 2007_Sep_29_08_40_19_sq
2007_Sep_29_08_57_36_dq, 2007_Sep_29_08_57_42_sq
2007_Oct_03_20_27_21_dq, 2007_Oct_03_20_27_35_sq
2007_Oct_03_20_39_35_dq, 2007_Oct_03_20_39_40_sq
2007_Oct_03_20_48_18_dq, 2007_Oct_03_20_48_29_sq
2007_Oct_03_20_56_51_dq, 2007_Oct_03_20_56_57_sq
2007_Oct_03_21_02_21_dq, 2007_Oct_03_21_02_27_sq
2007_Oct_03_21_22_02_dq, 2007_Oct_03_21_22_16_sq
2007_Oct_03_21_29_37_dq, 2007_Oct_03_21_30_10_sq
2007_Oct_03_21_42_56_dq, 2007_Oct_03_21_43_07_sq
2007_Oct_03_21_53_35_dq, 2007_Oct_03_21_53_44_sq
2007_Oct_03_22_09_34_dq, 2007_Oct_03_22_09_42_sq
2007_Oct_03_22_20_23_dq, 2007_Oct_03_22_20_30_sq
2007_Oct_05_12_02_25_dq, 2007_Oct_05_12_02_29_sq
2007_Oct_05_12_17_31_dq, 2007_Oct_05_12_17_36_sq
2007_Oct_05_12_34_59_dq, 2007_Oct_05_12_35_15_sq
2007_Oct_05_12_46_18_dq, 2007_Oct_05_12_46_23_sq
2007_Oct_05_12_59_55_dq, 2007_Oct_05_13_00_00_sq
2007_Oct_05_13_07_29_dq, 2007_Oct_05_13_07_35_sq
2007_Oct_05_13_20_14_dq, 2007_Oct_05_13_20_22_sq
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Company Impersonated
Ebay
Bank of America
Ebay
CapitalOne
PayPal
Wachovia
PayPal
PayPal
Capital One
PayPal
NetBank
Ebay
Citizen’s Bank
ETRADE
Bank of America
PayPal
MidAmerica Bank
Bank of America
NatWest Bank
Ebay
Citibank
Ebay
PayPal
Citizen’s Bank
PayPal
Capital One
Halifax FCU
Yahoo Mail
Wachovia
Ebay
Bank of America
Bank of America
Amazon
Citizen’s Bank
Citizen’s Bank
PayPal
Citadel FCU
NatWest
PayPal
Ebay
PayPal
Ebay
PayPal
PayPal
Citizen’s Bank
PayPal
Ebay
BankTennesee
Bank of the Cascades
Ebay
PayPal
Ebay

Table E.3
Referral Data
Case No
5

7

14

15
20
21
28

30

32

37

48
49

51

Referral Generated
172.176.239.46 - - [05/Jul/2007:20:59:50 -0500] "GET /html_files/
2007_Jul_05_20_56_17_sq_man.html HTTP/1.1" 200 33 http://us.f622.mail.yahoo.com/ym/ShowLetter?
MsgId=1681_27011077_8238_1357_447_0&Idx=0&YY=48392&y5beta=yes&y5beta=yes&inc=25&order=down&sort=date
&pos=0&view=a&head=f&box=Inbox" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
71.109.252.214 - - [03/Aug/2007:00:34:52 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Aug_02_20_48_31_sq_man.html
HTTP/1.1" 304 - "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070208
Mandriva/2.0.0.3-2mdv2007.1 (2007.1) Firefox/2.0.0.3
71.109.252.214 - - [03/Aug/2007:00:42:22 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Aug_02_20_48_26_dq_man.gif%5C HTTP/1.1"
404 317 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.8.1.3) Gecko/20070208 Mandriva/2.0.0.3-2mdv2007.1
(2007.1) Firefox/2.0.0.3
172.181.233.84 - - [11/Sep/2007:02:54:24 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_10_20_30_13_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20050915 Firefox/1.0.7"
172.181.233.84 - - [11/Sep/2007:02:54:39 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Sep_10_20_0_20_sq_man.html HTTP/1.1"
200 33 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.7.12) Gecko/20050915 Firefox/1.0.7"
62.231.97.162 - - [12/Sep/2007:11:02:02 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_10_20_43_39_dq_man.gif%5C HTTP/1.0"
404 317 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.6) Gecko/20070725 Firefox/2.0.0.6"
70.244.204.105 - - [17/Sep/2007:03:25:58 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_16_16_17_54_sq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.6) Gecko/20070725 Firefox/2.0.0.6"
89.35.62.17 - - [17/Sep/2007:20:14:46 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Sep_17_20_05_23_dq_man.html/ HTTP/1.1"
404 322 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)"
86.123.193.105 - - [29/Sep/2007:03:54:21 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Sep_28_21_57_36_dq_man.html HTTP/1.1"
200 33 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
86.123.193.105 - - [29/Sep/2007:03:54:38 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_28_21_57_36_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
172.139.141.155 - - [30/Sep/2007:12:19:56 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Sep_29_07_46_44_dq_man.html/
HTTP/1.1" 404 322 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
172.139.141.155 - - [30/Sep/2007:12:19:59 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_29_07_46_44_dq_man.gif/ HTTP/1.1"
404 317 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
172.139.141.155 - - [30/Sep/2007:12:20:07 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Sep_29_07_46_50_sq_man.html/’
HTTP/1.1" 404 323 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
172.139.141.155 - - [30/Sep/2007:12:20:10 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_29_07_46_50_sq_man.gif/’ HTTP/1.1"
404 318 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
89.33.93.72 - - [29/Sep/2007:08:30:21 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_29_08_26_21_dq_man.gif/ HTTP/1.1"
404 317 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
89.33.93.72 - - [29/Sep/2007:08:34:22 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Sep_29_08_26_21_dq_man.gif/ HTTP/1.1"
404 317 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
89.37.26.93 - - [03/Oct/2007:21:32:18 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Oct_03_20_48_29_sq_man.html HTTP/1.1"
200 33 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
89.38.10.22 - - [04/Oct/2007:08:47:49 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Oct_03_20_48_18_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "http://78.38.172.3/citadel/cit.txt" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727)"
89.38.10.22 - - [04/Oct/2007:08:47:49 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Oct_03_20_48_29_sq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "http://78.38.172.3/citadel/cit.txt" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727)"
172.183.122.233 - - [05/Oct/2007:12:38:03 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Oct_05_12_34_59_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
85.121.49.230 - - [05/Oct/2007:13:51:18 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Oct_05_12_46_18_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
85.121.49.230 - - [05/Oct/2007:13:51:20 -0500] "GET /html_files/2007_Oct_05_12_46_18_dq_man.html HTTP/1.1"
200 33 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)"
89.122.205.16 - - [05/Oct/2007:13:17:36 -0500] "GET /images/2007_Oct_05_13_07_29_dq_man.gif HTTP/1.1"
200 824 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.7) Gecko/20070914 Firefox/2.0.0.7"
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Table E.4
Phisher’s Data (1)
Case No
5

Phishers IP
172.176.239. 46

Phishers Location
United States

7
14
15
20
21
28
30
32
37

71. 109.252.214
172.181.233. 84
62. 231. 97. 162
70. 244.204.105
89. 35. 62. 17
86. 123.193.105
172.139.141.155
89. 33. 93. 72
89. 37. 26. 93
89. 38. 10. 22
172.183.122.233
85. 121. 49. 230
89. 122.205. 16

United States
United States
Romania
United States
Netherlands
Netherlands
United States
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
United States
Netherlands
Netherlands

48
49
51

Website Viewed
http://us.f622.mail.yahoo.com/
ym/ShowLetter?
MsgId=1681_27011077_8238_1357_447_0_1828_-1_0
&Idx=0&YY=48392&y5beta=yes&
y5beta=yes&inc=25&order=down
&sort=date&pos=0&view=a&head=f&box=Inbox
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
http://78.38.172.3/citadel/cit.txt
None
None
None
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Table E.5
Phisher’s Data (2)
Case No

Browser

OS

5
7
14
15
20
21
28
30
32
37

IE
Firefox
Firefox
Firefox
Firefox
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
Firefox

Windows NT 5.1
Linux
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1
Windows NT 5.1

48
49
51
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Turn Around
Time
00:03:33
04:46:19
06:34:11
50:18:23
11:08:04
00:09:23
05:56:45
28:33:12
00:04:00
00:43:49
11:59:31
00:03:54
01:05:00
00:10:07

